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In this paper, I consider the phenomenon of evaluation reversal for two 
classes of evaluative terms that have received a great deal of attention in 
philosophy of language and linguistics: slurs and thick terms. I consider 
three approaches to analyze evaluation reversal: (i) lexical defl ationist 
account, (ii) ambiguity account and (iii) echoic account. My purpose is 
mostly negative: my aim is to underline the shortcomings of these three 
strategies, in order to possibly pave the way for more suitable accounts.
Keywords: Slurs, thick terms, reclamation, evaluation reversal, 
ambiguity, echo.
1. Introduction
Language is not only used to describe state of affairs, but also to evalu-
ate them, i.e., to express subjective judgements. The most prototypi-
cal pieces of language that are employed for the purpose of evaluating 
are thin terms, such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, but many other expressions 
systematically convey evaluative contents: just to mention a few, the 
so-called thick terms, slurs, aesthetic predicates, predicates of personal 
taste and the like.
In this paper, I assess the phenomenon of evaluation reversal: uses 
of language in which a term that typically carries an evaluative content 
with a certain polarity (positive or negative) can be felicitously used in 
order to convey evaluative content with an opposite polarity (from posi-
tive to negative and vice versa). In this work, I focus on slurs and thick 
terms—expressions which are systematically associated with evalua-
tive contents—, while I leave aside descriptive terms that can be on oc-
casion used evaluatively (see Stojanovic 2016a, especially section 2.1). 
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Slurs are derogatory terms targeting individuals or groups on the 
basis of their belonging to a certain category.1 Prototypical English 
slurs target nationality, ethnic origins, sexual orientation, religion 
and so on, and they are associated with a negative evaluative content. 
Thick terms, on the other hand, are usually defi ned as those expres-
sions which combine descriptive and evaluative contents, both positive 
and negative:2 ‘generous’ for instance does not only refer to the proper-
ty of being willing to share one’s resources, but it also conveys the idea 
that it is good to be so; ‘lewd’ refers to the property of being sexually 
explicit beyond conventional boundaries, but it also conveys the idea 
that it is bad to be so. In this work, I do not go through all the possible 
theories of slurs and thick terms; instead I focus on the case of evalua-
tion reversal and critically discuss three accounts.
The paper goes as follows. In section 2 I briefl y present two phe-
nomena which can be accounted for in terms of evaluation reversal: the 
reclamation of slurs and the variability of thick terms. In section 3, I 
discuss three theories developed to account for reclamation or variabil-
ity (or both): they are the lexical defl ationist account (3.1), the ambigu-
ity account (3.2) and the echoic account (3.3). My goal is to pinpoint 
the shortcomings of each of them. My aim here is strictly negative, 
but clarifying the diffi culties of each approach should pave the way for 
more promising accounts.
2. Evaluation reversal: reclamation and variability
This section is dedicated to the reclamation of slurs (section 2.1) and 
variability of thick terms (section 2.2). In this paper, I do not develop 
an argument to support the thesis that the two phenomena are similar 
under crucial aspects (for a defense of a similar position, see Cepol-
laro 2017a), but I do treat both of them as cases where a lexical item 
conventionally associated with a positive or negative evaluation can be 
used on occasion with the opposite polarity. 
2.1 The reclamation of slurs
In the debate on slurs, scholars underline how these expressions sys-
tematically convey derogatory contents towards the target group re-
gardless of (i) how the slur is embedded and (ii) what the intentions of 
the speaker are. As for (i), we observe that an utterance like ‘Lea is a 
wop’ keeps being derogatory also when it is embedded under negation, 
conditional, modal, question: ‘Lea is not wop’, ‘If Lea is a wop, her son is 
too’, ‘Lea may be a wop’, ‘Is Lea a wop?’. The relation between slurs and 
derogation is such that the pejorative content resists when embedded 
1 See i.a. Potts (2005), Hom (2008), Anderson and Lepore (2013a, 2013b), Camp 
(2013), Cepollaro (2015), Jeshion (2013), Bolinger (2017).
2 See Hare (1963), Williams (1985), Blackburn (1992), Gibbard (1992), among 
others.
 B. Cepollaro, Negative or Positive? Three Theories 365
under semantic operators. As for (ii), consider a case where someone 
calls a person a slur and then apologizes by saying she did not mean to 
offend. The absence of the intention to offend is not enough to cancel or 
neutralize the derogation:3 slurs are demeaning, notwithstanding the 
intentions of the speaker.
However, we should not take these observations as evidence that 
there is no way in which slurs occur without being derogatory. As a mat-
ter of fact, slurs can also display some peculiar uses, that go under the 
label of ‘reclamation’, which seem to convey no derogation. Reclamation 
is the phenomenon for which the members of a target group can use the 
slur targeting their own group in such a way that slurs are not deroga-
tory in those cases. Reclamation constitutes a challenge to a theory of 
slurs which aims to account for the fact that the pejorative content of 
these expressions seems to resist all kinds of embedding and attempts of 
neutralization. The phenomenon raises many questions, some of which 
we will discuss here. Among the main issues scholars are faced with 
there is the question as to whether reclaimed uses of slurs are literal 
uses of language; as to whether, once a slur gets reclaimed, it is still the 
same lexical item as before; as to whether reclaimed uses of slurs pose 
similar moral problems as non-reclaimed ones; as to whether reclama-
tion can take place without political awareness or not, and so on.
To complicate the picture even more, as Jeshion (ms) underlines, 
reclamation is not a uniform and homogeneous phenomenon: there are 
many ways in which a slur can be used by in-groups without being 
derogatory. Some reclaimed uses of slurs convey positive evaluative 
content, some are just non-negative without being necessarily positive; 
some are possible for in-groups only, while some are available for out-
groups too; some sound ironic, satirical or sarcastic, while some do not, 
and so on. In this work, I am interested in reclaimed uses of slurs where 
the term is used in a positive way, that is, in the cases where the evalu-
ation conveyed by these expressions is reversed, not just suspended (for 
an analysis of evaluation suspension, see Cepollaro 2017a: section 3.2). 
It may turn out that this is just a subgroup of reclamation in general.
2.2 The variability of thick terms
Scholars in ethics and metaethics noticed that even though thick terms 
are associated with evaluative contents linked with a certain polar-
3 In the last decade, quite a few of these cases made it to the newspaper. What 
they all have in common is that someone used a slur and then tried to apologize by 
appealing to their own non-derogatory intentions; in all of those cases, this attempted 
apology failed to excuse them, as in the case of slurs the absence of a derogatory 
intention does not typically cancel the derogation which did take place nevertheless. 
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ity, on occasion they can be felicitously used with an opposite polari-
ty.4 Just to make an example, provided that ‘chaste’ typically carries 
a positive evaluation, under certain circumstances, it can be used in a 
negative way. This example is taken from the Corpus Of Contemporary 
American-English (or COCA; Davies 2008):
“Not sure how long I’ll be gone. (…)’. Elaine gave him a quick kiss on the 
cheek. ‘That was a little chaste’. ‘Don’t look now, but we seem to be of inter-
est to about fi fty elderly women on the tour bus behind you’ ‘Should we give 
them something to stare at?”
It looks like the speaker is using ‘chaste’ as a negative thing for a kiss 
to be; despite the use of an evaluative term with a positive polarity, 
the speaker is not endorsing that kind of positive evaluation, quite the 
contrary: he is using ‘chaste’ as meaning to convey a negative rather 
than positive evaluation. The example which is mostly discussed in 
the literature is the positive use of a thick term with negative polarity, 
namely ‘lewd’. The original example from Blackburn is the following:
“[We may] worry that this year’s Carnival was not lewd enough” (Blackburn 
1992: 296, quoted in Väyrynen 2013: 217).
But Väyrynen (2013) changes the example a bit in order to avoid the 
unneeded complications brought about by the expression ‘not enough’ 
and credits Matti Eklund for the fi nal version of the example:
“The carnival was a lot of fun. But something was missing. It just wasn’t 
lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year” (Väyrynen 2013: 85)
The speaker is using ‘lewd’, typically associated with a negative evalu-
ation, as expressing a positive one. As in the case of reclamation, schol-
ars need to address questions e.g. whether instances of variability 
count as literal uses of thick terms or as to whether, once an expression 
like ‘lewd’ gets used positively, it is still an instance of the same lexical 
item as before.
3. Three theories of evaluation reversal: 
lexical defl ationism, ambiguity, echo
In this section, I consider three possible approaches to evaluation re-
versal and I apply them to the case of reclamation and variability. 
These strategies have been explicitly proposed to account for the phe-
nomenon of evaluation reversal in relation to thick terms specifi cally 
(this is the case for the lexical defl ationist account, section 3.1), or to 
slurs (this is the case for ambiguity account, section 3.2) or to both slurs 
and thick terms (echoic account, section 3.3). In what follows, I try to 
see how each of these approaches can explain evaluation reversal for 
both slurs and thick terms. As announced, my aim is negative: my goal 
is to underline the shortcomings of the three strategies in order to pave 
the way for more promising accounts.
4 Hare (1952), Blackburn (1992), Väyrynen (2011, 2013), Eklund (2013).
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3.1 Lexical defl ationism
The lexical defl ationist account of evaluation reversal was put forward 
for the variability of thick terms rather than for the reclamation of 
slurs. However I assess its plausibility both for slurs and thick terms, 
by following a suggestion of Väyrynen (2016).
Lexical defl ationism amounts to the idea that the reason why the 
evaluation conveyed by slurs and thick terms can change polarity on 
occasion is that it is not lexically encoded. For this approach, the evalu-
ative content with which these expressions are associated consists in 
pragmatic implications; the addressees infer the evaluative content 
(and of course its polarity) in each context. Väyrynen (2013) defends a 
similar thesis for thick terms; moreover, Väyrynen (2016) hints at the 
possibility to develop a theory of slurs along similar lines; to him, the 
resulting approach would resemble Bolinger (2017)’s one. For Bolinger, 
the derogatory content of slurs is due to purely pragmatic mechanisms: 
In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the 
speaker signals that she endorses the term (and its associations). Such an 
endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense 
whenever a speaker’s use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the 
slurring term. (Bolinger 2017: 439)
In this framework, when speakers reclaim a slur, they use it defi antly, 
without endorsing the relevant associations; as the group of speakers 
who do so grows, the link between the lexical item and the associated 
contents grows weaker and weaker. When reclamation reaches a cer-
tain stage, it is the context that determines each time whether the slur 
carries a negative evaluative content or not. Such a strategy, defended 
by Väyrynen and arguably by Bolinger too, appears to analyze slurs 
and thick terms in a way that makes them similar to terms that do not 
lexically encode evaluation, but can be used in evaluatively on occa-
sion—either positively or negatively—, for instance ‘intense’ (see Stoja-
novic 2016a, 2016b about “valence-underspecifi cation”).
Let us now look at the shortcomings of lexical defl ationism. As far 
as thick terms are concerned, one may wonder if the context is really 
enough to determine the polarity of the evaluative content. In what 
follows, I propose a case which suggests, contra lexical defl ationism, 
that it is the lexical content which determines the interpretation of the 
evaluation. Suppose there are two thick terms which share the same 
descriptive content such that one is typically associated with a positive 
evaluation and the other with a negative one. For the sake of the ex-
ample, suppose that this is the case for ‘reckless’ and ‘brave’, so assume 
that their descriptive meaning amounts to something like ‘willing to do 
something dangerous’, while their evaluative contents have opposite 
polarities, one negative, one positive. Now suppose that two such terms 
are used in the same context:
A. What she did was courageous!
B. It was not. It was reckless.
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The two speakers, A and B, agree on what the facts are and what the 
act at stake is and, nevertheless, disagree on how to evaluate it. If lexi-
cal defl ationism were right, the audience of such a dialogue would be 
confused about how the two speakers evaluate the act at stake: since for 
this approach it is the context and not the lexical content which deter-
mines the interpretation of the evaluative content, if the context is one 
and the same and—by hypothesis—the descriptive content is the same, 
the context should attribute the same evaluative content to both of them. 
However, the audience of the dialogue has no diffi culty in understanding 
that A approves of the action under discussion and B disapproves of it. I 
argue that this is so because the evaluation is in fact lexically encoded: 
competent speakers can come up with a default interpretation roughly 
corresponds to the conventional meaning of the term at stake.
As far as slurs are concerned, on the other hand, lexical defl ation-
ism in the version of Bolinger (2017) has some problems in accounting 
for the intuition that slurs are derogatory also in a context where they 
are speakers’ default choice (e.g. racist environments and discussions). 
Let me state again that for lexical defl ationists, slurs do not lexically 
encode offensive contents, they are only pragmatically associated with 
them as a matter of contrastive choice. If that was the case, then they 
would not be associated with any such content in a situation where 
they are the default choice. In other words, lexical defl ationism can 
account for the intuition that slurs are derogatory (i.e. they convey of-
fensive contents) when they occur in non-racist environments, but not 
when they occur in bigot contexts, where they do not trigger any prag-
matic implication in virtue of being the default option. I take this as 
evidence that lexical defl ationism is wrong in postulating that slurs do 
not convey derogatory contents at the level of conventional meaning.
To sum up, we started from observing that lexical defl ationism has 
an easy way to explain evaluation reversal: since the evaluative con-
tent is not lexically encoded in the conventional meaning of slurs and 
thick terms, its polarity can change on occasion. However, we have 
observed that this approach has problems on its own explaining the 
behavior of slurs and thick terms in general and thus it may not be a 
viable option to account for evaluation reversal. In what follows, we 
consider two alternative theories which endorse the claim that slurs 
and thick terms lexically encode evaluative contents. The challenge 
which these approaches need to meet is to account for the possibilities 
for such evaluative contents to change polarity.
3.2 Ambiguity
The ambiguity account of evaluation reversal was put forward for the 
reclamation of slurs rather than for the variability of thick terms. How-
ever, as I did for the lexical defl ationist approach, I shall consider both 
applications.
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The main point of the ambiguity account of reclamation is that once 
slurs are reclaimed, a new word comes to exist. Many scholars endorsed 
this thesis5 which it gets rid of the problem raised by reclamation at 
its source: it rejects the idea that a lexical item undergoes an evalua-
tion reversal, since there are in fact two different lexical items. Accord-
ing to this approach, reclamation does not challenge those theories of 
slurs which analyze the derogatory content as part of the conventional 
meaning of the term, because in this framework reclaimed slurs are 
not instances of the same lexical items as slurs; in fact, they are not 
‘slurs’ properly speaking. They are other terms with a different—and 
non-derogatory—meaning. The same would hold for thick terms: once 
a thick term is used with a different polarity, a new evaluative term 
comes to existence.
In the debate on slurs, this proposal has received some criticism 
from Anderson and Lepore (2013a) and Anderson (2018), an objection 
which Ritchie (2017) calls ‘Reclamation Worry’ (RW). The criticism is 
the following: if there was an ambiguity relation between reclaimed 
and non-reclaimed slurs, then any speaker would be able to felicitously 
use one or the other lexical item; however, this is famously not the case, 
as usually only in-groups and not out-groups can felicitously use the 
non-derogatory term. Anderson and Lepore use this argument against 
the theories of slurs which (i) are content-based (i.e. hold that these 
expressions lexically encode pejorative contents) and (ii) explain recla-
mation by relying on an ambiguity account. For Anderson and Lepore, 
because not every speaker can use any meaning of a slur (derogatory 
and non-derogatory), then the ambiguity thesis of reclamation must be 
wrong and therefore content-based theories should be rejected because 
they would have no other way to explain reclamation.6
In what follows, I present challenges to the ambiguity thesis that are 
orthogonal to the Reclamation Worry, as I do not take it to constitute a 
problem for the ambiguity thesis. In fact, in Cepollaro (2017b) I argued 
that, on a closer inspection, the RW should not trouble the defendants 
of the ambiguity account too much, because there are further cases in 
other languages (e.g. personal pronouns in French, German, Italian, 
Spanish) where two lexical items are ambiguous and the issue of which 
speaker can use which term is a matter of socially-determined factors. 
Leaving that worry aside, the main problem with the ambiguity thesis 
is that it raises more diffi culties than it would have initially appeared. 
In particular, it needs a detailed characterization of ‘ambiguity’, which 
is something that scholars tended to overlook. As Anderson (2018) un-
derlines: “Positing a lexical ambiguity, for example, would mean that 
5 Hom (2008: 428, 438), Richard (2008: 16), Saka (2007: 146–147), Miščević 
(2011: 176), Jeshion (2013: 250–253), Whiting (2013: 370).
6 Section 3.3 shows that this is not the case: content-based views are also 
compatible with the echoic account; so, Anderson and Lepore’s criticism would not 
suffi ce anyway to challenge content-based approaches, even if the objection towards 
the ambiguity thesis were correct. 
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either [the N-word] corresponds to non-identical entries in the lexicon 
or it expresses multiple meanings”. As Anderson remarks, there are 
two options available for the ambiguity account, which we can attribute 
to the phenomena of homonymy and polysemy. The fi rst characteriza-
tion—homonymy—boils down to analyze a standard and a reclaimed 
slur as corresponding to two different entries in the dictionary.7 The 
second characterization—polysemy—is to posit that a standard and a 
reclaimed slur correspond to one lexical entry with multiple meanings.
Let me start from homonymy, which is the phenomenon for which 
two lexical items are written and pronounced in the same way and such 
a thing is—so to speak—accidental: there is no special connection (for 
instance at the level of etymology) between the two terms. This is the 
case for example for ‘bank’: we can talk about two different lexical en-
tries bank1 and bank2, where the former refers to the fi nancial institu-
tion and the latter to the river side. We can observe that the two items 
have different etymologies and that the two meanings corresponding to 
bank1 and bank2 are expressed by different words in other languages 
(‘banca’ vs. ‘sponda’ in Italian, ‘banque’ vs. ‘rive’ in French, etc.). If we 
look at the relation between a standard offensive use of a slur and a 
reclaimed one, we observe that it does not resemble homonymy: the two 
uses do not correspond to terms with different etymologies and the link 
between the offensive and the non-offensive use of the term does not 
amount to an accident, as in the case of bank1 and bank2.
 The second option for the ambiguity thesis to characterize the rela-
tion between standard and reclaimed slurs is polysemy, the phenom-
enon for which one term has multiple meanings that correspond to dif-
ferent aspects. For instance, take ‘bottle’. The lexical item can refer to 
the object or to the content of the object, as in “The bin is full of empty 
bottles” (object) and “She drank two bottles of Pastis” (content). The 
two meanings—object and content—correspond to two related aspects 
of the concept BOTTLE. If we go back to slurs, we see that if ambiguity 
is characterized in terms of polysemy, standard and reclaimed slurs 
would have to correspond to different meanings of the same word. This 
sounds more promising than holding that the two are not related and 
that the ambiguity is merely accidental, as in the case of homonymy 
(see ‘bank’). However, the two meanings do not seem to correspond to 
two aspects of the same concept, as in prototypical cases of polysemy. If 
we look at instances of regular polysemy, we cannot really trace cases 
where the two aspects involved only differ at the level of evaluative 
rather than descriptive content. The same observations can be made 
for thick terms.
The ambiguity account needs deeper investigation on homonymy 
and polysemy in order to develop a detailed and precise proposal of 
7 Which is something Ritchie (2017) has in mind when she formulates the 
Reclamation Worry by noticing that “Anyone can use ‘bank’ to mean fi nancial 
institution or side of a river”.
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evaluation reversal, because, as it stands, there are too many dissimi-
larities between the homonymy and polysemy involving descriptive 
meanings on the one hand (see ‘bank’, ‘bottle’) and the case of evalu-
ation reversal involving evaluative meanings on the other hand (see 
slurs and thick terms).
Finally, the ambiguity account needs a supplementary story about 
how the evaluation reversal begins in the fi rst place: we know that for 
new lexical items (or new meanings of old words) to come to exist, cer-
tain conditions have to be met: the fact that a term is on occasion used 
with a different polarity than usual does not seem enough to postulate 
the creation of a new lexical item. The echoic theory that we discuss in 
the following section seems to be better equipped to account for how the 
reversal begins.
3.3 Echo
The echoic account of evaluation reversal was originally put forward 
for the reclamation of slurs by Bianchi (2014), furtherly supported by 
Miščević and Perhat (2016), and extended to the variability of thick 
terms in Cepollaro (2017a).
The bulk of the proposal is that the cases of evaluation reversal are 
instances of dissociative echoic uses of language, i.e. cases in which by 
uttering an evaluative locution the speaker is evoking the evaluative 
content conveyed by that particular term, but at the same time she is 
expressing her dissociation with respect to such content. Instances of 
evaluation reversal are not literal uses of evaluative language. As a 
matter of fact, the echoic theory was put forward by Sperber and Wilson 
(1986) in order to account for irony: in ironic utterances, speakers evoke 
some thought, belief or expectation that they attribute to someone else 
and at the same time they express their dissociation with respect to 
the evoked content. In this sense, evaluation reversal counts as a case 
of irony. Since irony involves a dissociative attitude, the possibility for 
irony to be successful (i.e. to be felicitous and to get recognized) requires 
a correct interpretation of attitudes. As a consequence, for evaluation 
reversal to be successful, the audience needs to recognize and correctly 
interpret the attitude of the speaker, which leaves room for all sorts 
of misunderstanding. Recall the example we mentioned in section 2.2., 
when the speaker complained about a kiss by saying “That was a little 
chaste”. For the echoic theory, the speaker is evoking the evaluative 
content associated with ‘chaste’, namely ‘it is good to be abstaining from 
sexual intercourse’, and he is making fun of it by expressing his disso-
ciative attitude. The same goes for slurs: when the actress, singer and 
stand-up-comedian Lea DeLaria calls herself ‘that fucking dyke’; what 
she does is evoking the pejorative content associated with the homopho-
bic slur and expressing her dissociation from it at the same time.
The echoic approach can tell a plausible story about how evaluation 
reversal starts: it starts by defi antly subverting the lexically encoded 
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evaluation of a certain locution by means of irony. However, there are 
a few points on which the theory shows its weaknesses and call for 
adjustment.
Most of the diffi culties that the approach has concern slurs rather 
than thick terms, for which, on the contrary, it seems to work quite 
well (for a contrary opinion, see Väyrynen 2013). The main issue is 
whether the echoic theory can account for all cases of reclamation. As 
noticed in section 2.1, reclamation is far from being a uniform and ho-
mogenous phenomenon: different instances display different proper-
ties. In particular, there are cases which are convincingly captured by 
the ironic explanation (for instance, the above-mentioned examples of 
uses of ‘chaste’ and ‘dyke’). To support the view, notice that the clearer 
the ironic intentions are, the easier it is for the audience to understand 
that the usual evaluation is subverted. On the other hand, however, 
not all instances of reclamation appear to be ironic, not even in the 
technical sense which Sperber and Wilson have in mind. In particu-
lar, advanced-stage cases of reclamation seem to have lost the ironic 
fl avor. Consider for example certain uses of ‘queer’: if one talks about 
the ‘queer studies’ class she is taking, it is implausible to postulate an 
ironic use of ‘queer’, it is just how the class is called; if one appreciates 
‘queer tango nights’, there is no reason to imagine that she is being 
ironical, it is just how certain kinds of tango are called. In other words, 
when the process of reclamation is at an enough-advanced stage—i.e. 
when there is an attested non-derogatory use of the expression which 
used to be a slur—, the reclaimed uses can cease to sound ironic. Note 
that this feature (the absence of ironic fl avor) does not depend on the 
fact that reclaimed uses of ‘queer’ become available for out-groups too: 
as a matter of fact, also some reclaimed uses of the ‘n-word’ which are 
available for in-groups only fail to display irony.
The fact that the echoic approach does not seem to account for all in-
stances of reclamation can be taken to suggest either that reclamation 
is not a uniform and homogeneous phenomenon and that therefore new 
explanations are required—as Jeshion (ms) claims—or that the echoic 
account is well-equipped to account for some cases of reclamation but 
needs some sort of supplementary story for the non-ironic cases.
4. Conclusion
As stated at the beginning, this paper has a negative purpose, i.e. un-
derling the shortcomings of three existing accounts of evaluation rever-
sal. The analysis focused on two different cases of evaluatives—slurs 
and thick terms—in order to look at evaluation reversal with a broader 
stance. In particular, after presenting the phenomenon at stake (sec-
tion 2), I argued that lexical defl ationism has troubles explaining the 
behavior of slurs and thick terms in the fi rst place and thus it should 
not be taken as a viable explanation of evaluation reversal (section 3.1); 
as for the ambiguity thesis, I showed that it lacks a detailed account 
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of how standard cases of homonymy and polysemy relate to the case of 
evaluatives (section 3.2). Finally, I moved to the echoic approach (sec-
tion 3.3) and underlined that despite its many merits, it displays some 
weaknesses in accounting for what appear to be non-ironical uses of re-
claimed slurs. I hope that by clarifying the diffi culties of each approach, 
I paved the way for more promising theories.
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